Mercurial > vanilla
diff compression/unzip/CVE-2014-9636.patch @ 452:8c4366128400
compression/unzip: initial import, closes #1553
author | David Demelier <markand@malikania.fr> |
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date | Sat, 06 Apr 2019 08:13:23 +0200 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/compression/unzip/CVE-2014-9636.patch Sat Apr 06 08:13:23 2019 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 190040ebfcf5395a6ccedede2cc9343d34f0a108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: mancha <mancha1 AT zoho DOT com> +Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2015 +Subject: Info-ZIP UnZip buffer overflow + +By carefully crafting a corrupt ZIP archive with "extra fields" that +purport to have compressed blocks larger than the corresponding +uncompressed blocks in STORED no-compression mode, an attacker can +trigger a heap overflow that can result in application crash or +possibly have other unspecified impact. + +This patch ensures that when extra fields use STORED mode, the +"compressed" and uncompressed block sizes match. + +--- + extract.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -2217,6 +2217,7 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_si + ulg eb_ucsize; + uch *eb_ucptr; + int r; ++ ush method; + + if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */ + return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */ +@@ -2226,6 +2227,13 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_si + eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))) + return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */ + ++ method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset)); ++ if ((method == STORED) && ++ (eb_size - compr_offset - EB_CMPRHEADLEN != eb_ucsize)) ++ return PK_ERR; /* compressed & uncompressed ++ * should match in STORED ++ * method */ ++ + if ( + #ifdef INT_16BIT + (((ulg)(extent)eb_ucsize) != eb_ucsize) ||