Mercurial > vanilla
changeset 452:8c4366128400
compression/unzip: initial import, closes #1553
author | David Demelier <markand@malikania.fr> |
---|---|
date | Sat, 06 Apr 2019 08:13:23 +0200 |
parents | bcfdaa03daa2 |
children | dc81a1fa4b2e |
files | compression/unzip/CVE-2014-8139.patch compression/unzip/CVE-2014-8140.patch compression/unzip/CVE-2014-8141.patch compression/unzip/CVE-2014-9636.patch compression/unzip/CVE-2014-9913.patch compression/unzip/CVE-2016-9844.patch compression/unzip/CVE-2018-1000035.patch compression/unzip/unzip.sh |
diffstat | 8 files changed, 421 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) [+] |
line wrap: on
line diff
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/compression/unzip/CVE-2014-8139.patch Sat Apr 06 08:13:23 2019 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -298,6 +298,8 @@ + #ifndef SFX + static ZCONST char Far InconsistEFlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \ + EF block length (%u bytes) exceeds remaining EF data (%u bytes)\n"; ++ static ZCONST char Far TooSmallEBlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \ ++ EF block length (%u bytes) invalid (< %d)\n"; + static ZCONST char Far InvalidComprDataEAs[] = + " invalid compressed data for EAs\n"; + # if (defined(WIN32) && defined(NTSD_EAS)) +@@ -2032,7 +2034,8 @@ + ebID = makeword(ef); + ebLen = (unsigned)makeword(ef+EB_LEN); + +- if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) { ++ if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) ++ { + /* Discovered some extra field inconsistency! */ + if (uO.qflag) + Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, "%-22s ", +@@ -2167,11 +2170,29 @@ + } + break; + case EF_PKVMS: +- if (makelong(ef+EB_HEADSIZE) != +- crc32(CRCVAL_INITIAL, ef+(EB_HEADSIZE+4), +- (extent)(ebLen-4))) +- Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(BadCRC_EAs))); ++ /* 2015-01-30 SMS. Added sufficient-bytes test/message ++ * here. (Removed defective ebLen test above.) ++ * ++ * If sufficient bytes (EB_PKVMS_MINLEN) are available, ++ * then compare the stored CRC value with the calculated ++ * CRC for the remainder of the data (and complain about ++ * a mismatch). ++ */ ++ if (ebLen < EB_PKVMS_MINLEN) ++ { ++ /* Insufficient bytes available. */ ++ Info( slide, 1, ++ ((char *)slide, LoadFarString( TooSmallEBlength), ++ ebLen, EB_PKVMS_MINLEN)); ++ } ++ else if (makelong(ef+ EB_HEADSIZE) != ++ crc32(CRCVAL_INITIAL, ++ (ef+ EB_HEADSIZE+ EB_PKVMS_MINLEN), ++ (extent)(ebLen- EB_PKVMS_MINLEN))) ++ { ++ Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(BadCRC_EAs))); ++ } + break; + case EF_PKW32: + case EF_PKUNIX: +--- a/unzpriv.h ++++ b/unzpriv.h +@@ -1806,6 +1806,8 @@ + #define EB_NTSD_VERSION 4 /* offset of NTSD version byte */ + #define EB_NTSD_MAX_VER (0) /* maximum version # we know how to handle */ + ++#define EB_PKVMS_MINLEN 4 /* minimum data length of PKVMS extra block */ ++ + #define EB_ASI_CRC32 0 /* offset of ASI Unix field's crc32 checksum */ + #define EB_ASI_MODE 4 /* offset of ASI Unix permission mode field */ + +
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/compression/unzip/CVE-2014-8140.patch Sat Apr 06 08:13:23 2019 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +From RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=969621&action=diff +(unzip60/ path prefix added) + +--- unzip60/extract.c 2009-03-14 02:32:52.000000000 +0100 ++++ unzip60/extract.c 2014-12-05 22:43:13.000000000 +0100 +@@ -2221,10 +2234,17 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_si + if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */ + return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */ + ++ /* Return no/bad-data error status if any problem is found: ++ * 1. eb_size is too small to hold the uncompressed size ++ * (eb_ucsize). (Else extract eb_ucsize.) ++ * 2. eb_ucsize is zero (invalid). 2014-12-04 SMS. ++ * 3. eb_ucsize is positive, but eb_size is too small to hold ++ * the compressed data header. ++ */ + if ((eb_size < (EB_UCSIZE_P + 4)) || +- ((eb_ucsize = makelong(eb+(EB_HEADSIZE+EB_UCSIZE_P))) > 0L && +- eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))) +- return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */ ++ ((eb_ucsize = makelong( eb+ (EB_HEADSIZE+ EB_UCSIZE_P))) == 0L) || ++ ((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))) ++ return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no/bad compressed data! */ + + if ( + #ifdef INT_16BIT
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/compression/unzip/CVE-2014-8141.patch Sat Apr 06 08:13:23 2019 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +From RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=969625&action=diff +(unzip60/ path prefix added) + +--- unzip60/process.c 2009-03-06 02:25:10.000000000 +0100 ++++ unzip60/process.c 2014-12-05 22:42:39.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -1888,48 +1888,82 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len) + and a 4-byte version of disk start number. + Sets both local header and central header fields. Not terribly clever, + but it means that this procedure is only called in one place. ++ ++ 2014-12-05 SMS. ++ Added checks to ensure that enough data are available before calling ++ makeint64() or makelong(). Replaced various sizeof() values with ++ simple ("4" or "8") constants. (The Zip64 structures do not depend ++ on our variable sizes.) Error handling is crude, but we should now ++ stay within the buffer. + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + ++#define Z64FLGS 0xffff ++#define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff ++ + if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL) + return PK_COOL; + + Trace((stderr,"\ngetZip64Data: scanning extra field of length %u\n", + ef_len)); + +- while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) { ++ while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) ++ { + eb_id = makeword(EB_ID + ef_buf); + eb_len = makeword(EB_LEN + ef_buf); + +- if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) { +- /* discovered some extra field inconsistency! */ ++ if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) ++ { ++ /* Extra block length exceeds remaining extra field length. */ + Trace((stderr, + "getZip64Data: block length %u > rest ef_size %u\n", eb_len, + ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)); + break; + } +- if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) { +- ++ if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) ++ { + int offset = EB_HEADSIZE; + +- if (G.crec.ucsize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.ucsize == 0xffffffff){ +- G.lrec.ucsize = G.crec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.ucsize); ++ if ((G.crec.ucsize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.ucsize == Z64FLGL)) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ ++ G.crec.ucsize = G.lrec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.csize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.csize == 0xffffffff){ +- G.csize = G.lrec.csize = G.crec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.csize); ++ ++ if ((G.crec.csize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.csize == Z64FLGL)) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ ++ G.csize = G.crec.csize = G.lrec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == 0xffffffff){ ++ ++ if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == Z64FLGL) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ + G.crec.relative_offset_local_header = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.relative_offset_local_header); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.disk_number_start == 0xffff){ ++ ++ if (G.crec.disk_number_start == Z64FLGS) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 4 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ + G.crec.disk_number_start = (zuvl_t)makelong(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.disk_number_start); ++ offset += 4; + } ++#if 0 ++ break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */ ++#endif /* 0 */ + } + +- /* Skip this extra field block */ ++ /* Skip this extra field block. */ + ef_buf += (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE); + ef_len -= (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE); + } +--- unzip60/fileio.c 2009-04-20 02:03:44.000000000 +0200 ++++ unzip60/fileio.c 2014-12-05 22:44:16.000000000 +0100 +@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ static ZCONST char Far FilenameTooLongTr + #endif + static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] = + "warning: extra field too long (%d). Ignoring...\n"; ++static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldCorrupt[] = ++ "warning: extra field (type: 0x%04x) corrupt. Continuing...\n"; + + #ifdef WINDLL + static ZCONST char Far DiskFullQuery[] = +@@ -2295,7 +2297,12 @@ int do_string(__G__ length, option) /* + if (readbuf(__G__ (char *)G.extra_field, length) == 0) + return PK_EOF; + /* Looks like here is where extra fields are read */ +- getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length); ++ if (getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length) != PK_COOL) ++ { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString( ExtraFieldCorrupt), EF_PKSZ64)); ++ error = PK_WARN; ++ } + #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT + G.unipath_filename = NULL; + if (G.UzO.U_flag < 2) {
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/compression/unzip/CVE-2014-9636.patch Sat Apr 06 08:13:23 2019 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 190040ebfcf5395a6ccedede2cc9343d34f0a108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: mancha <mancha1 AT zoho DOT com> +Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2015 +Subject: Info-ZIP UnZip buffer overflow + +By carefully crafting a corrupt ZIP archive with "extra fields" that +purport to have compressed blocks larger than the corresponding +uncompressed blocks in STORED no-compression mode, an attacker can +trigger a heap overflow that can result in application crash or +possibly have other unspecified impact. + +This patch ensures that when extra fields use STORED mode, the +"compressed" and uncompressed block sizes match. + +--- + extract.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -2217,6 +2217,7 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_si + ulg eb_ucsize; + uch *eb_ucptr; + int r; ++ ush method; + + if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */ + return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */ +@@ -2226,6 +2227,13 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_si + eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))) + return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */ + ++ method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset)); ++ if ((method == STORED) && ++ (eb_size - compr_offset - EB_CMPRHEADLEN != eb_ucsize)) ++ return PK_ERR; /* compressed & uncompressed ++ * should match in STORED ++ * method */ ++ + if ( + #ifdef INT_16BIT + (((ulg)(extent)eb_ucsize) != eb_ucsize) ||
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/compression/unzip/CVE-2014-9913.patch Sat Apr 06 08:13:23 2019 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info> +Subject: Fix CVE-2014-9913, buffer overflow in unzip +Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/bugs/27/ +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/847485 +Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/387350 +X-Debian-version: 6.0-21 + +--- a/list.c ++++ b/list.c +@@ -339,7 +339,18 @@ + G.crec.compression_method == ENHDEFLATED) { + methbuf[5] = dtype[(G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag>>1) & 3]; + } else if (methnum >= NUM_METHODS) { +- sprintf(&methbuf[4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method); ++ /* 2013-02-26 SMS. ++ * http://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/bugs/27/ CVE-2014-9913. ++ * Unexpectedly large compression methods overflow ++ * &methbuf[]. Use the old, three-digit decimal format ++ * for values which fit. Otherwise, sacrifice the ++ * colon, and use four-digit hexadecimal. ++ */ ++ if (G.crec.compression_method <= 999) { ++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method); ++ } else { ++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 3], "%04X", G.crec.compression_method); ++ } + } + + #if 0 /* GRR/Euro: add this? */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/compression/unzip/CVE-2016-9844.patch Sat Apr 06 08:13:23 2019 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info> +Subject: Fix CVE-2016-9844, buffer overflow in zipinfo +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/847486 +Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1643750 +X-Debian-version: 6.0-21 + +--- a/zipinfo.c ++++ b/zipinfo.c +@@ -1921,7 +1921,18 @@ + ush dnum=(ush)((G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag>>1) & 3); + methbuf[3] = dtype[dnum]; + } else if (methnum >= NUM_METHODS) { /* unknown */ +- sprintf(&methbuf[1], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method); ++ /* 2016-12-05 SMS. ++ * https://launchpad.net/bugs/1643750 ++ * Unexpectedly large compression methods overflow ++ * &methbuf[]. Use the old, three-digit decimal format ++ * for values which fit. Otherwise, sacrifice the "u", ++ * and use four-digit hexadecimal. ++ */ ++ if (G.crec.compression_method <= 999) { ++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 1], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method); ++ } else { ++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 0], "%04X", G.crec.compression_method); ++ } + } + + for (k = 0; k < 15; ++k)
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/compression/unzip/CVE-2018-1000035.patch Sat Apr 06 08:13:23 2019 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +--- a/fileio.c 2014-12-05 05:06:05 -0600 ++++ b/fileio.c 2017-11-14 01:06:28 -0600 +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2017 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -1582,6 +1582,8 @@ + int r = IZ_PW_ENTERED; + char *m; + char *prompt; ++ char *ep; ++ char *zp; + + #ifndef REENTRANT + /* tell picky compilers to shut up about "unused variable" warnings */ +@@ -1590,9 +1592,12 @@ + + if (*rcnt == 0) { /* First call for current entry */ + *rcnt = 2; +- if ((prompt = (char *)malloc(2*FILNAMSIZ + 15)) != (char *)NULL) { +- sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt), +- FnFilter1(zfn), FnFilter2(efn)); ++ zp = FnFilter1( zfn); ++ ep = FnFilter2( efn); ++ prompt = (char *)malloc( /* Slightly too long (2* "%s"). */ ++ sizeof( PasswPrompt)+ strlen( zp)+ strlen( ep)); ++ if (prompt != (char *)NULL) { ++ sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt), zp, ep); + m = prompt; + } else + m = (char *)LoadFarString(PasswPrompt2);
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/compression/unzip/unzip.sh Sat Apr 06 08:13:23 2019 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# Copyright (c) 2019 David Demelier <markand@malikania.fr> +# +# Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any +# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above +# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. +# +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES +# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR +# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES +# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN +# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF +# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. +# + +PKGNAME=unzip +PKGVERSION=6.0 +PKGREVISION=1 +PKGLICENSE="CUSTOM" +PKGSUMMARY="utility to decompress zip files" +PKGDOWNLOAD="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/infozip/${PKGNAME}60.tar.gz" +PKGDEPENDS="core/bzip2" + +: ${CC:=clang} + +build() +{ + rm -rf ${PKGNAME}60 + tar xvaf ${PKGNAME}60.tar.gz + pushd ${PKGNAME}60 + + patch -p1 < ../CVE-2014-8139.patch + patch -p1 < ../CVE-2014-8140.patch + patch -p1 < ../CVE-2014-8141.patch + patch -p1 < ../CVE-2014-9636.patch + patch -p1 < ../CVE-2014-9913.patch + patch -p1 < ../CVE-2016-9844.patch + patch -p1 < ../CVE-2018-1000035.patch + + # does not support DESTDIR, fake it with prefix. + make -f unix/Makefile CC="$CC" generic + make -f unix/Makefile \ + prefix=$DESTDIR/usr \ + MANDIR=$DESTDIR/usr/share/man/man1 \ + install + + popd + rm -rf ${PKGNAME}60 +}